Lara Kajs
Thinking Out Loud
Washington, DC — 11 November 2026
Elections are often treated as the clearest measure of democratic health. They determine who governs, provide a mechanism for political change, and allow citizens to reject leaders who have failed to represent them. But even a decisive electoral result cannot establish that a democracy is functioning effectively, that its institutions remain independent, or that those who exercise power will be held accountable.
Recent elections in Brazil, Serbia, Israel, and the United States have brought this distinction into focus. The outcomes differ substantially, as do the political and institutional conditions in each country. Yet they raise a common question: what happens after the votes are counted?
Democracy is not simply the process through which political authority is acquired. It is also the system of laws, institutions, and safeguards that governs how that authority may be exercised—and what happens when it is abused.
An Electoral Mandate Is Not Institutional Accountability
The recent U.S. midterm elections produced a decisive shift in congressional control, with Democrats winning majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The result creates an opportunity for Congress to reassert its oversight responsibilities, investigate executive conduct, and exercise its constitutional role as a coequal branch of government. That opportunity, however, should not be mistaken for accountability already achieved.
Congressional oversight can expose misconduct, compel testimony, preserve evidence, and establish a public record. Legislative investigations can also identify failures in government policy and administration. But congressional inquiries are not criminal proceedings. They do not determine individual criminal guilt, and a change in political control cannot substitute for independent judicial processes.
The distinction between political and legal accountability is essential. A legislature may investigate an administration’s conduct, but criminal responsibility must be established through lawful procedures, independent institutions, and applicable evidentiary standards. Oversight should not become an instrument of political retaliation. Its purpose is to ensure that executive authority remains subject to meaningful scrutiny.
The new congressional majority will therefore face a test that extends beyond its ability to oppose the administration. It must demonstrate that oversight is grounded in constitutional responsibility rather than partisan advantage. Accountability cannot be credible only when it is directed at political opponents.
Polarization and the Erosion of Institutional Confidence
Political polarization presents a further challenge. When public confidence in institutions becomes closely tied to political identity, courts, legislatures, and electoral authorities risk being treated as extensions of political competition rather than independent mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Public scrutiny of institutions is necessary in a democracy, and criticism is not itself evidence of institutional failure. The danger arises when political loyalty becomes the principal measure of institutional credibility—when lawful decisions are rejected solely because of their outcomes, or oversight is considered legitimate only when it targets an opposing party.
This dynamic can weaken institutional legitimacy across the political spectrum. Independent institutions must be able to apply the law and perform their constitutional functions even when their decisions are unpopular. If people accept their authority only when it produces a politically favorable result, their ability to mediate disputes and enforce accountability diminishes.
Elections can change who holds power. They cannot, by themselves, restore public confidence in institutions whose independence has been called into question.
Lara Kajs — Thinking Out Loud
Israel: Electoral Change and the Limits of Political Renewal
Israel’s October election illustrates the difference between an electoral setback for an incumbent and a completed transfer of power. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led bloc lost its parliamentary majority, but the election produced no clear governing alternative. The Likud bloc holds 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, while the bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot holds 48. Arab-led parties won the remaining 10 seats. Eisenkot has been tasked with forming a government, but the negotiations remain difficult, and Netanyahu continues to serve as caretaker prime minister.
The outcome has created an opening for political change, but it does not establish that institutional renewal will follow. Proposals to reconsider judicial changes, strengthen oversight, and investigate failures surrounding the October 7, 2023 attacks may become part of the new government’s agenda. Whether those proposals result in independent investigations and durable institutional safeguards remains to be seen.
The broader accountability question extends beyond Israel’s domestic political institutions. An assessment of democratic governance cannot be confined to the political rights enjoyed by a state’s electorate while disregarding the rights of people living under its occupation or affected by its military actions. Compliance with international law and the protection of fundamental rights do not become less consequential because a government faces an election or changes its leadership.
A new administration may create an opportunity to reconsider policy and restore institutional safeguards. It does not, by itself, resolve allegations of serious violations or discharge obligations to investigate them. Those responsibilities remain regardless of which political coalition governs.
What the Outcome Could Mean for Palestinians
The implications of Israel’s election extend well beyond its domestic political institutions. For Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank, the composition and priorities of Israel’s next government could have direct consequences for civilian protection, displacement, humanitarian conditions, and the prospects for political self-determination.
In Gaza, a change in leadership could influence the implementation of ceasefire arrangements, humanitarian access, reconstruction, and the future role of Israeli forces. Yet the principal opposition leadership has not articulated a fundamental departure from the prevailing security framework. Its position on Hamas’s disarmament and Israel’s continued security role suggests that a change in government would not necessarily produce a substantial shift in the conditions governing Palestinian life in the territory. The distinction between a change in political leadership and a policy change is therefore critical.
In the occupied West Bank, the potential for more immediate policy differences may be greater. Eisenkot has opposed unauthorized settlement outposts, settler violence, and the proposed E1 settlement expansion, which would further undermine the territorial continuity of a future Palestinian state. A different governing coalition could also reconsider the withholding of Palestinian Authority tax revenues, which has placed additional pressure on an already fragile system of public administration and essential services. However, opposition to particular settlement policies does not necessarily amount to support for Palestinian sovereignty or an end to the occupation.
There is a fundamental democratic and political dimension to this issue. Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank do not participate in Israel’s national elections, yet the decisions of the Israeli government can profoundly affect their security, rights, and political future. Their protection cannot be treated as a secondary consideration in evaluating the conduct of a government or the strength of its democratic institutions.
Any meaningful change must therefore be assessed through its consequences: whether civilians are better protected, humanitarian needs can be met, displacement and settlement expansion are addressed, and Palestinians can exercise their rights. A change in government alone cannot answer those questions.
Majority Rule Does Not Override Minority Rights
The relationship between majority rule and minority rights is central to this discussion. Elections authorize representatives to govern, but a numerical majority does not have unlimited authority over the rights of those who voted against it or those with little political influence.
Constitutional protection, equal treatment under the law, freedom of expression, and meaningful political participation are not privileges that can be withdrawn when a majority finds them inconvenient. They establish the boundaries within which democratic authority must operate.
Without those protections, electoral processes can produce governments with a legitimate mandate to govern while weakening the conditions that make democratic participation meaningful. A democracy must be judged not only by whether the majority can exercise power, but also by whether those outside that majority retain their rights, representation, and protection under the law.
This principle applies to political minorities within a country and to populations whose lives are shaped by state power without having a meaningful role in choosing those who exercise it. Democratic legitimacy cannot be measured solely by the preferences of the electorate.
Electoral Victories Do Not Restore Institutions on Their Own
Brazil and Serbia offer further examples of the possibilities and limitations of electoral change.
In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva secured another presidential term after defeating Flávio Bolsonaro in the October runoff. The result prevented a return to presidential power by the Bolsonaro political movement, but it did not eliminate the political divisions that will shape Lula’s next term. Electoral victory changes the leadership of the executive; it does not, on its own, resolve the institutional and political challenges facing the country.
In Serbia, a student-led opposition movement won the outright parliamentary majority, defeating the political establishment associated with Aleksandar Vučić. The result demonstrated the capacity of sustained civic mobilization to challenge entrenched power. But an electoral victory, even one that produces a governing majority, does not immediately reverse years of weakened democratic safeguards. The independence of public institutions, the rule of law, and the ability of civil society and the media to operate without threats must be established in practice.
These outcomes differ, but both demonstrate that political change and institutional restoration are separate processes. Elections can create the conditions for reform. Whether that opportunity is used depends on the willingness of those in power to strengthen independent oversight, respect legal constraints, and permit public institutions to function without political interference.
Civic participation is essential to that process. A functioning democracy depends on more than the ability to vote. People must also be able to organize, criticize government, access information, and demand answers without intimidation. Accountability between elections is as important as the electoral process itself.
Accountability Must Extend Beyond National Politics
The relationship between election and accountability becomes even more consequential when serious human rights violations and international crimes are involved.
States have primary responsibility for protecting rights, investigating alleged violations, and ensuring that those responsible are held accountable through fair legal processes. When domestic institutions are unwilling or unable to act independently, however, accountability may become selective or disappear altogether.
International mechanisms provide important avenues for addressing some of these failures. The International Criminal Court, for example, investigates and prosecutes individuals for crimes within its jurisdiction, subject to the Rome Statute and its requirements, including the principle of complementarity. The Court does not replace national judicial systems or provide a general remedy for every human rights violation. Its authority is specific and governed by law.
The underlying principle is broader: political office does not place individuals beyond legal responsibility, and an electoral mandate does not erase obligation under international law. Allegations must be assessed through credible investigations and appropriate legal processes. They cannot be dismissed simply because addressing them is politically difficult.
This is where domestic democratic accountability and international accountability intersect. Institutions that tolerate impunity weaken the protection of rights and undermine confidence in the rule of law. The same concern applies internationally when government demands accountability for adversaries while resisting scrutiny of their own conduct or that of their allies.
Consistency is not a matter of political preference. It is essential to the credibility of the legal principles intended to protect individuals from abuses of power.
Democracy Is Measured Between Elections
The recent electoral outcomes demonstrate that political power can be challenged, even where governing parties have appeared firmly entrenched. That is an important feature of democratic systems. But democratic resilience cannot be measured by election results alone.
It must also be measured by whether courts can rule independently, legislatures can scrutinize the executive, journalists and civil society can operate freely, and minority rights remain protected when doing so is politically inconvenient. It must ask whether alleged abuses are investigated regardless of the identity or influence of those implicated.
These safeguards are not secondary to democracy. They are what prevent electoral authority from becoming unchecked power.
For countries emerging from periods of institutional erosion, the challenge is not simply to replace political leadership. It is to restore the conditions under which public institutions can operate independently, and the law can be applied consistently. That work takes longer than an election cycle and requires more than promises of reform.
An election can open the door to change. It cannot ensure that change follows.
The ballot remains fundamental to democracy, but democracy is sustained by what happens after it is cast: whether institutions remain independent, whether rights are protected, and whether those entrusted with power are answerable for how they use it. Without those safeguards, elections may change the people who govern while leaving the underlying conditions of unaccountable power intact.
Photo Credit
Israel Elections Ballot Box by Heinrich Bol-Stiftung. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0
About Thinking Out Loud
Thinking Out Loud is a commentary series by Lara Kajs examining international law, humanitarian crises, and the prevention of mass atrocities. Drawing on field experience in conflict and displacement settings, the column explores the legal and policy challenges that shape contemporary conflicts.
About the Author
Lara Kajs is the founder and executive director of The Genocide Report, a Washington, DC-based educational nonprofit focused on atrocity prevention and international law. She is the author of several field-based books on conflict, displacement, humanitarian crises, and international humanitarian law, drawing on extensive research and field experience in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan. Her writing and public speaking focus on atrocity crimes, forced displacement, the protection of civilians, and the legal frameworks governing armed conflict.