Lara Kajs
Thinking Out Loud
Washington, DC — 21 October 2026
Gaza, Syria, Yemen, and Ethiopia represent four distinct conflicts, yet each illustrates the limits of a political declaration that is not matched by effective civilian protection. In Gaza, violence has continued despite a declared ceasefire. In Syria, recurring violence has tested the promise of a political transition. In Yemen and Ethiopia, arrangements intended to reduce hostilities have failed to resolve the underlying conditions of conflict, and fighting has intensified again. The law governing armed conflict does not cease to apply when a pause is announced, and scrutiny of violations must not diminish simply because a conflict is described as entering a new phase.
I followed Syria’s transition closely, including the fall of the Assad government, and have often considered the moment when a conflict stops being described as a war and begins to be described as an aftermath. That change in language does not necessarily reflect conditions on the ground. It can instead reflect a broader desire to regard a crisis as resolved before the security, political, and institutional conditions for lasting peace are in place.
A Ceasefire as a Label
In October 2025, a ceasefire was announced in Gaza. Within weeks, UN experts reported at least 393 violations attributed to Israel, which they said had killed 339 Palestinians, including more than 70 children. They also noted that more than half of Gaza remained under Israeli military control, with active sites beyond the agreed withdrawal line. A year later, the UN human rights office reported that Israeli attacks had continued, killing and injuring Palestinians and causing repeated displacement. Its investigators verified 1,076 conflict-related deaths between the ceasefire announcement and the end of July 2026, including 268 children.
The circumstances surrounding these deaths are as important as the aggregate figures. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) verified the deaths of 331 people near the so-called yellow line. In many of these cases, it found no information indicating that the victims had posed a threat to Israeli forces. High Commissioner Volker Türk questioned how the continuing killings could be reconciled with the declared ceasefire.
The record also includes reported killings of Palestinians by Hamas during the ceasefire period. In September, OHCHR further reported that operations by Palestinians armed elements, reportedly supported by Israeli forces, were causing civilian harm. These findings require attention to the conduct of each party and the evidence available in each case. They do not, however, erase the broader pattern documented by UN investigators: Israeli attacks accounted for the large majority of the verified deaths cited in the reporting.
A ceasefire is a commitment to reduce or end hostilities. Its significance must be assessed against what happens to civilians after it is declared.
“Peace must be measured by what civilians experience—not simply by what political leaders declare.”
A Transition Measured by Its Violence
Syria is not a ceasefire case, but its transition raises a related question: what does a change in political authority actually deliver for the people living under it? The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has documented successive waves of violence since the transition began. These include the violence along the coast and in western central Syria in March 2025, the hostilities in Suwayda in July 2025, and the fighting between government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in January 2026. The Commission has emphasized that comprehensive accountability, inclusion, and guarantees of non-recurrence are essential to a successful transition. It has also reported that many hundreds of people remain missing following the January hostilities.
A balanced assessment must also recognize developments that may support accountability. The Commission has noted the adoption of a transitional justice law and the commencement of trials concerning violations committed during the Assad era. These steps matter, particularly in a country emerging from decades of repression and years of war. Their significance, however, will depend on whether accountability is pursued consistently and whether institutions can protect people regardless of their identity, political affiliation, or perceived association with the former government.
The Commission has also expressed deep concern about apparent acts of vigilantism against alleged former members of the previous government in Homs. Its earlier investigations documented torture and ill-treatment in 18 official detention facilities. These findings underscore the danger of allowing the pursuit of accountability to become a justification for further abuses. A transition cannot establish the rule of law by reproducing the practices it is meant to end.
External actors further complicate the picture. The Commission has reported that Israeli military activity in southern Syria has become increasingly sustained and entrenched. As of June 2026, it had identified 49 people, including two children, detained by the Israeli military on Syrian territory, and stated that these acts may amount to war crimes. Such findings raise questions not only about the protection of civilians but also about respect for sovereignty and the obligations governing the use of force and conduct during armed conflict.
The removal of a government does not, in itself, secure a transition. Its success depends on whether the institutions that replace it protect civilians, uphold the rule of law, and prevent the recurrence of serious violations—and whether external actors are held to the same legal standards.
The Same Pattern Elsewhere
Yemen illustrates how a period of relative calm can be mistaken for a resolution of conflict. The truce that took effect in April 2022 formally expired that October, but large-scale fighting did not immediately resume. For several years, the relative reduction in hostilities was widely understood to be a sign of greater stability. Beneath that relative calm, however, the country remained divided among competing authorities, its economy and institutions continued to weaken, and the political disputes underlying the war remained unresolved.
In September 2026, fighting intensified again along Yemen’s western coast. The UN refugee agency estimated that approximately 128,000 people had been newly displaced by 22 September, adding to the millions already uprooted by years of conflict. The renewed fighting exposed the limits of a period of reduced hostilities that had not been accompanied by a durable political settlement or the restoration of the conditions necessary for civilian security.
Ethiopia followed a different trajectory toward a similar outcome. The Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 provided for a permanent cessation of hostilities, disarmament, and a political process. Yet disputes over territory, the return of displaced people, and the political and security arrangements in Tigray remained unresolved. On 23 September 2026, a rebel alliance that includes the Tigray People’s Liberation Front attacked government forces across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar. Eritrea has since severed diplomatic relations with Addis Ababa, raising concerns that renewed national conflict could develop into a wider regional crisis.
These cases differ substantially, and their differences matter. In Gaza, violence has continued despite a declared ceasefire; in Syria, recurring violence has tested the institutions and commitments of a political transition. In Yemen and Ethiopia, arrangements intended to reduce hostilities have failed to resolve the underlying disputes, and fighting has intensified again.
What connects them is not an identical sequence of events but a recurring political failure: agreements that provide immediate relief are treated as if they have resolved the conditions that produced the conflict. Questions of governance, territorial control, the safe return of displaced people, accountability, and the protection of civilians remain unsettled. Armed actors retain the capacity to resume hostilities, while international attention shifts elsewhere.
When the political foundations of peace remain fragile, a pause can become a postponement rather than a path toward resolution. Civilians bear the consequences when the unresolved conflict returns to the foreground.
What the Law Requires
International humanitarian law does not become applicable only when fighting reaches its greatest intensity, nor does it cease to apply simply because a ceasefire is announced. Its continuing application depends on the existence and legal classification of an armed conflict, not on whether political leaders describe the situation as a war, a transition, or a period of calm. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions establishes minimum protections in non-international armed conflicts, while applicable treaty and customary rules govern the conduct of parties across different types of armed conflict.
Civilians who are not taking part in hostilities must be protected from attack. Parties must distinguish between civilians and combatants, and between civilian objects and military objectives, and must comply with the rules of proportionality and precautions in attack. Deliberately directing attacks against civilians is prohibited and may constitute a war crime. The precise legal characterization of an incident depends on the facts, the applicable law, and the evidence available.
These obligations do not depend on political alignment. The same legal standards apply to state and non-state parties where the relevant rules bind them. Military capability, diplomatic relationships, and claims of self-defense do not create a general exemption from the obligations owed to civilians. Nor should allegations against one party be used to excuse violations by another.
Consistency is fundamental to the credibility of international law. When governments and institutions condemn violations by adversaries but minimize or excuse comparable conduct by allies, they weaken the very protections they claim to uphold. Accountability must follow the evidence, not political convenience. As UN experts have emphasized in their reporting on Gaza, lasting peace cannot be separated from accountability.
What Declaring Peace Obligates Us to Do
The declaration that a conflict has ended should be treated as a proposition to be tested against conditions on the ground, not as a conclusion in itself. For civilians, the meaning of peace is measured in concrete terms: whether the killing has stopped, whether displaced persons can return safely and voluntarily, whether essential services function, whether those responsible for serious violations face credible accountability, and whether violations continue to be documented.
A ceasefire or political transition that fails to deliver meaningful protection risks becoming peace in name only. The language of resolution can obscure continuing harm and diminish the pressure for action precisely when sustained scrutiny remains necessary.
The responsibility that follows is practical. It requires documenting violations during periods of relative calm as rigorously as during active hostilities, identifying those responsible when the evidence supports attribution, applying consistent legal standards to allies and adversaries, and ensuring that diplomatic language does not displace the factual record. It also requires attention to the conditions that make renewed violence possible: unresolved political disputes, weakened institutions, displacement, impunity, and the continued vulnerability of civilians.
The people living through conflict do not experience peace as a declaration. They experience it through their ability to live safely, exercise their rights, rebuild their communities, and trust that the institutions around them will not again expose them to violence or arbitrary abuse. Gaza, Syria, Yemen, and Ethiopia demonstrate why the distinction matters. A reduction in hostilities can be a vital achievement, but it is not a substitute for civilian protection, accountability, or a durable political settlement. Those who have endured war and displacement are not served by optimism detached from evidence. They are served by sustained attention—and by the willingness to keep looking when the world has decided that the story is over.
Photo Credit
UN Women Humanitarian Work – Za’atari Camp, Jordan by UN Women Gallery. Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.
About Thinking Out Loud
Thinking Out Loud is a commentary series by Lara Kajs examining international law, humanitarian crises, and the prevention of mass atrocities. Drawing on field experience in conflict and displacement settings, the column explores the legal and policy challenges that shape contemporary conflicts.
About the Author
Lara Kajs is the founder and executive director of The Genocide Report, a Washington, DC-based educational nonprofit focused on atrocity prevention and international law. She is the author of several field-based books on conflict, displacement, humanitarian crises, and international humanitarian law, drawing on extensive research and field experience in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan. Her writing and public speaking focus on atrocity crimes, forced displacement, the protection of civilians, and the legal frameworks governing armed conflict.